

Tajiks  
Kent-Turks

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## THE MUSLIM PERIOD AND THE TSARS

PT. I

[10] Khan, and Soviet publicists, of design or in ignorance, have sought for this reason to affirm that they are not Muslims. There is also a tendency to play up their Persian speech as a counter to Turkish nationalism, and we find all the great Persian poets, even Saadi and Hafiz of far-away Shiraz, figuring in Soviet history as honorary Tajiks. As fighters the Turkish stocks hold the Tajiks in derision, and the annals of the Basmachi period have an amusing description<sup>1</sup> of a Tajik detachment which turned out in support of Enver Pasha:

They were followers of the Sheikhs and Mullahs, well-fed and fat and quite useless for fighting. They wore large wooden clogs with soles two inches thick, had carpets on their saddles, and tea-kettles hanging from them. When they started to run in battle, all this naturally fell off.

Here is the inspiration for the White Knight of Lewis Carroll.

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[10] Most of the townsmen and many of the settled cultivators south of the Tien-shan speak both a Turkic tongue and the Tajik form of Persian. Togan<sup>2</sup> calls them Kent-Turks or Town-Turks, and is inclined to claim them as being of pure Turkish stock, unmixed with Iranian blood or influence. This insistence is odd and hard to reconcile with the fact of the long-established Persian influence in Transoxiana. Moreover, he himself is constrained to attribute the fanatical attitudes of the town-bred *ulema* to Persian influences, and to note their physical resemblance — strong growth of beard and so on — to the Persian and Afghan people farther south. He observes that the new Russian ethnical division of his Türkili has caused the settled Turks to call themselves Uzbeks, and here perhaps is the key to his case.

[617]  
Possibly it is they [he writes] who cling most passionately to the name. They who once regarded the Uzbeks as barbarians, now take an interest in the literature of the Uzbek tribe which is replacing the too subtle legends of Persia. It may be that the language of the real Uzbeks will impress itself on the Iranized Kent dialect,<sup>3</sup> and the genuinely Uzbek qualities come to life again.

1 Togan, *op. cit.* p. 440.

2 *Op. cit.* p. 48 et seq.

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3 Long association with Persian has caused the Uzbek spoken in Bukhara and Samarkand to lose the vowel harmonies, and debased the gerund and participial constructions characteristic of all genuine Turkic languages.

**181** combined region of Kitab and Shahr-i-Sabz before the Russians came. He found him a man whose word he could implicitly trust, possessed of much delicacy of mind and feeling, with an appreciation of what is due to himself and of an aristocratic bearing in every look and movement. In appearance Jüre Beg was tall and handsome, simply dressed but exquisitely neat, with a thin beard, pleasant dark eyes, and a serious face — a strict Muslim, but altogether without fanaticism — an excellent judge of character, with the politeness of Asia at his finger's end, yet with dignity to act as he thought right. He conformed indeed, says Schuyler, to his notion of perfect breeding. Togan, writing sixty years later of the same man, speaks of the great respect in which Jüre was held by his own people and Russians alike. He came of a nomad Uzbek tribe, like the Kazaks not greatly influenced by Persian manners, but he had a fine library which he was proud to show to Barthold, whom he allowed to catalogue it. To the Russian Barthold, he said, 'The Russian administration in Turkistan is very like that of the Mongols; they choose the worst men from among us and use them against their fellow countrymen'.

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No writer on the Turks of Central Asia can avoid a reference to the slogans under which various forces interested in this region have from time to time sought to enlist the interest of the Eastern Turks in a larger political union. Different banners have been unfurled, beneath which a Turkic renaissance should take place. The following definition<sup>1</sup> is that given in Togan's work, with a conclusion that no one creed offers, as it stands, a worthy or practicable goal for the Turks.

The three terms, pan-Islamism, pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism, are first stated. The first, the religious appeal, which would draw in other peoples of the Muslim world, is seen as a strand only of a more real and deep Turkish patriotism. Generally, pan-Islamism is dismissed as a political force, partly because most of these writers and thinkers themselves started

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.* pp. 560 et seq.  
[i.e. by Togan - see cat. 116. pp. 7-9 ... Analyst]

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## PATTERN OF PEOPLES

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very much to the left, and partly no doubt in deference to the inspirations of modern Turkey. While therefore it is possible to speak in moving terms of Islam in the hearts of the people, far beyond the confines of the mosque or the conceptions of the *ulema*, as a political watchword it is regarded by the new nationalism as a mirage of imperialists. 186

The pan-Turanian idea is defined as a Hungarian proposal for a league of all Turkish, Mongol, Hungarian and Finno-Ugrian stocks — a sort of political Altaics. This has only to be stated to be dismissed as theory empty of political content, because it lacks the necessary social and geographical nexus.

Lastly, pan-Turkism is defined as originally the product of the mind of the Hungarian Vambéry. As a political force it is discounted, but the new nationalism finds attractions in the idea of an entente of races of strictly Turkish stock. There is a search for a cultural and social image of a sort to appeal to those lost in the desert, who need a well whereby to quench their thirst and recover their bearings. Togan himself by no means envisages a unified Turkic State, federal or otherwise, under the hegemony of Turkey; indeed he quotes sayings of that protagonist of such impulses, Enver Pasha, recognizing that, although there should be a common inspiration for peoples of Turkish stock, and all Turks, west and east, should be free of foreign domination, it is no use to look forward to a formal unity, even of language. He does not say it, but he seems to look forward to a loose gathering of the clans not unlike the modern conception of the Commonwealth, in cultural harmony, a group of adults, acting together in danger but under no formal obligations. The inspiration of his thought is best imparted in his own words.<sup>1</sup>

The movement for Turkish unity [he writes], is not a fancy that all the Turks will ever create a political structure. When we talk of a Turkish world we think of a civilization of Turkish complexion and Turkish spirit. In Turkey, as in Turkistan, there was research into Turkish history, national literature and custom. It aroused intense interest not only in Turcological publications by

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 352.

• 186 European scholars, but also among Europeans generally as giving an increased insight into the Turkish world. The question of the historical unity of Turkish culture is being more and more explained. The two mystics, Ahmed Yesevi of the XIIIth century in Yese [the town now itself called Turkistan near the Sir Darya] and Yunus Emre 150 years later in Anatolia, represented one and the same school and culture. The ancient enmity typified by the war between Bayezid and Timur, the respective national heroes of the Western and Eastern Turks, began to lose its force. The national literature of Azerbaijan shows how Chingiz and Timur are becoming the greatest heroes of a national consciousness common to all Turks. There is no doubt that Ismail Gaspirali's<sup>1</sup> work had an influence in Turkey, and was the first sign of the reforms which took shape 50 years later under Atatürk.

[346] The Yesevite School of Ahmed Yesevi in the realm of religion; the epics of Oghuz Khan, Dede Korkut and Kōroghlu<sup>2</sup> in the domain of literature; the works of art and monuments of the East Turks and the West Turks; all these are a pledge of the universal significance of Turkish civilization. Until recently historians of the art of the Osmanli period held the Green Mosque at Bursa to be purely an Osmanli work; it now transpires that it is ornamented by Tabriz tile-artists who knew the art of the Ilkhans, and by a Bursa decorator who had learned his craft in the time of Timur at Samarkand. The monuments of the Ilkhan period at Tabriz, the mosques of the Timurids at Meshed and Herat, the glorious *medreses* at Samarkand, Yese and Urgench are of one and the same Turkish civilization.

○○○ In the Caucasus a pan-Turkish ideal arouses jealousies among those who are not Turks, or even Muslims. But that is another story; here in Turkistan emphasis on this ideal need not weaken the national resistance from Europe against the Great Russians, nor should Georgians and Armenians suspect motives which inspire those who seek the independence of the homelands of the Turks.

On the narrower stage of Turkistan east of the Caspian,

<sup>1</sup> Crimean writer, XIXth century. See Chapter XIII, p. 226.

<sup>2</sup> Old epics of the Uzbek, Kazak and Turkmen tribes handed down by word of mouth. Soviet scholars have done much to reduce them to writing, but usually to Russian and not in the original. The latest Ukase is that this is the literature of a bygone feudal age, teaching a false bourgeois nationalism and must be shunned.

On this subject see Bib. II, 7, Dr. Wiener.

563 lady was working under her husband in one of his laboratories. But 'My husband is a Kazak,' she said, 'allow me to introduce him'. Behind the comfortable assertions of harmony there lurks the impression that she patronized her husband and treated him as a sort of interesting exhibit. This very Satpaiev is one of those pilloried in the 1951 press for seeking to defend colleagues accused of nationalist deviations. Even the possession of a Russian wife has not availed to protect him, or else the Kazak in him has not been wholly tamed. Many, like Satpaiev, have fallen in the race after they had served their turn.

661 More recently there has been no pretence of the respect-  
● 186 ability of nationalism. The press teems with abuse and diatribes to the address of any public man with a Muslim name who may be held suspect for a display of nationalistic tendencies. Many have been purged. Early examples were Faizullah Khojaev,<sup>1</sup> chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, and Ikramov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party. Others have had short shrift. The usual gazette formula applied to men of high place, up to the rank of Premier of a republic, is to say they are 'removed to attend a special study course' or 'for duties elsewhere'. A recent case is that of Abdul jabbar Abdurrahmanov, another chairman of the Council of Ministers in Uzbekistan, a man widely publicized for orthodox views up to 1950 and decorated with the Order of Lenin. He disappeared in April of that year, charged with violation of the constitution and turning the Uzbek Communist Party into an asylum for reactionary elements. At the same time his Deputies, Ghulamov and Kichamov, were mentioned as 'no longer there' when a new government was formed.

As things are, the very word of nationalism is one of the unholy things, and it is a far journey back to the Declaration of 1917. Every force that can be thought of has been applied

<sup>1</sup> For an interesting description of this man in his Soviet hey-day see Bib. I, 66, p. 172.

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to overcome any centrifugal impulse in the colonial territories of the Soviet Empire. First in order was the power derived from the presence of a Russian population, infusing into a plural society an outside element as strong as are the Chinese in Malaya. The monolithic Constitution, the rooting of the Party sprung from its parent stem, the artificial division of natural local unities, applied education and linguistics — all these pressures have been steadily brought to bear against the realization of national or industrial particularism over a period of some thirty years. And in the background, always present, is the secret police and military force at the disposal of the Union.

The flood is the same flood as that which swept over Turkistan in Tsarist days. Like the waters of the Oxus after storms in the mountains, it may be turgid, but it is the same river, unpredictable in the direction of its attack, but submerging the landmarks till all is flat and even and the last resistance is overcome.

## XIV

## DEVIATIONISM

*If I climb up into heaven, thou art there ;  
If I go down to hell, thou art there also.  
If I say, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me,  
Then shall my night be turned to day.*

ooo IN Stalinist jargon every word I have quoted here would be termed ideological distortion, deviationism, apoliticality, gross manifestation of bourgeois-nationalism calling for immediate correction by means of a radical ideological-creative reorientation. Babur would not have liked it, but that is how they talk ; indeed, each phrase comes straight from the current press. We have seen how in the earlier days the Soviets resolved the contradiction between their national professions and their real objectives by evoking the rights of the proletariat as a higher force which must overcome the right of national self-determination. In effect, although they did not then so formulate it, their case at that time was that the loss of a nation's right to independence is no doubt an evil, but it is a lesser evil than the sacrifice of the rights of the workers. (Note that the fact that in Central Asia all the 'workers' were then Russian is immaterial to the doctrine as a first principle.) Since, as they say, continued independence would have involved the latter, the loss of independence, regrettable in theory, must follow. But in the first years, as the Kremlin saw it, it was expedient to accord lip-service to an abstract nationalism so far as to encourage a local literature and a press which should play up Central Asian resistance to the Tsarist conquest. At the time this could do no harm ; it diverted national patriotisms to a past age, and it drew a possibly useful distinction between the Bolsheviks and the outmoded Russian Empire to which they had suc-

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ceeded. National tradition therefore was lauded, national epics were unearthed and reduced to writing, and there was a period of studious academic research into the national achievements of the various parts of Turkistan. These early years were indeed in many respects favourable to the work of profound Russian scholars such as Barthold and Samoylovich. The temporary relaxation also served to encourage the emergence of a native intelligentsia ambitious to combine pride in their national past with the outlook of a Communist on the contemporary world. It was a fool's paradise.

In those early years this encouragement of what may be called a cultural nationalism was expressed by the now outdated 'School of Pokrovsky'. Pokrovsky was a well-known Russian historian who lived from 1868 to 1932, so flourishing in both the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. Once esteemed by the Soviets as an evangelist, he is now discredited, and with him the edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*<sup>1</sup> which borrowed his learning and announced his gospel. His historical theory was the simple one of regarding the annexation of any non-Russian territory by Tsarist Russia as an absolute evil, resistance to which on the part of a national-liberation movement was a progressive and even a revolutionary act. Pokrovsky in fact was the mouthpiece of the apparent liberalism which prompted the Declaration of November 1917 on the right of all nations to independence, and incidentally was useful for export. It was not long before this school of thought was found too productive of national pride. After some preliminary outpost actions of a probing nature, the Pokrovsky theory met with definite official attack in a Decree dated 27th August 1937, issued by the jury of the Government Commission for the Best Textbook on the History of the USSR.<sup>2</sup> This Decree assailed Pokrovsky as the slave of a defective anti-Marxist convention, (the author of a heresy which has become anathema. In the place of his theory it propounded a new first principle known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil, now an immaculate doctrine in the Soviet Creed.

<sup>1</sup> Bib. III, 10. See Vol. 43, Column 856.

<sup>2</sup> Bib. II, 11.

186 The dogma of the Lesser Evil is briefly this. Oppressive  
626 though the Tsarist régime may have been, it was less evil and  
oppressive than the alternative then open to non-Russian  
nationalities, namely, annexation by Turkey. (At this time  
the case of Armenia was chiefly in point.) And oppressive  
and evil though the Tsarist capitalism may have been, it led  
the annexed peoples away from Feudalism through Capitalism  
along the only road to Socialism, and was therefore a lesser  
evil than a continued independence. Thus this dogma was an  
extension backwards into Tsarist history of the sort of reason-  
ing from first principles which enabled the Soviets by means  
of the Doctrine of the Proletariat to justify to their own  
minds the crushing in their time of the new nationalism that  
arose in the interregnum period. Both dogmas were shafts  
aimed at one target, the native nationalists who, if they  
believed in the dialectic of historical materialism, wished that  
it should develop within the framework of a national and not  
a Great Russian consciousness. The difference was that under  
the newest dogma — that of the Lesser Evil — it was no  
longer even respectable for a 'Colonial' nationalist to take  
pride in the prowess of his people even against the Tsarist  
conqueror. Great Russia in both her incarnations was hence-  
forward to be regarded as unassailable, above criticism, the  
instrument by which the ultimate reality was inevitably to  
prevail.

The ground was prepared for the propagation of this  
doctrine in 1937, before World War II, at about the period  
of the greatest intensity of the purges. But other preoccupa-  
tions, with the War itself, prevented active steps being taken  
for its enforcement until the post-War period. From 1945  
onwards enforcement has taken the form of an all-out campaign  
against nationalism in any form. Such tendencies are com-  
pendiously described as bourgeois-nationalism, feudal sur-  
vivalism or pan-Islamic pan-Turkic capitalist distortions or  
deviations, and are detected in every field of thought or  
cultural endeavour, social, literary and aesthetic. In their  
most secret thoughts all men, women and children must turn

to Moscow as their Mecca ; language, literature and the arts must follow suit ; the praise of past achievement is ruled out ; and even an appreciation of the beauties of nature is a sign of unhealth and decadence. Stalin is quoted as having said ' that the remnants of capitalism in people's consciousness are far more alive over the question of nationality than in any other sphere, since they are able to mask themselves in national costume ; hence the need to be ever vigilant against the smallest manifestations of nationalist remnants, in whatever guise they may appear. 186 626

The campaign got into full swing with an article in *Pravda*, published on 26th December 1950, and subsequently echoed, in season and out, in all the local press of the five republics. What follows is taken direct from press and platform diatribes against 'bourgeois-nationalism' and is no exaggeration. Sometimes there is a trace of unintended humour, but in general the theme is so reiterative that it produces a conscious reaction of boredom and even, let it be said, a sense of spiritual hunger.

The first move is a direction to historians to hold correct views on the history of their republic in relation to its association with Great Russia. In considering the formation of the Uzbek nation, for instance, the favourable influence of this association, even with Tsarist Russia, must be the main theme. For union under the Tsars brought feudal Central Asia into the system of world capitalism and saved it from the wretched fate of slavery to British imperialism. The Stalinist view is that this union slowly developed a bourgeois nation, out of which was born a socialist nation under the impact of the Communist Party and with the brotherly assistance of the Russian people. But emphasis is needed on the prime condition that the Uzbek, or other, nation must desire to associate its national interests with the vital interests of the USSR as a whole. Above all, it is to be realized that all progressive thought, social and economic, was formed under the beneficent influence of Russian culture, and owes nothing to Western Europe. The only impact of the latter was the 186 814 626

[Sec cat. 116, pp. 230-33 Bib. II, 2, 1, 5]

186 Anglo-American 'intervention' in the 1919-20 period. Even  
814 the American intervention, claiming to be economic, could  
626 not be dissociated from the political plans of the militarists  
and revealed the bestial character of the American imperialists,  
no disinterested benefactors as was Great Russia. Thus  
historians, philosophers, economists and literary scholars, all  
alike, must in their works display the influence of the Great  
Russian people in the formation of social thought in Asia.  
Their works must be permeated with the Bolshevik Party  
spirit and give a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the past.  
At the base of every thought must be the treatises of Stalin  
on questions such as linguistics. These will give them a  
correct understanding of the historical process.

538 It follows that resistance to the Russian conquest is no  
186 longer to be seen as a splendid, though unsuccessful, enter-  
prise. Henceforth poetry or prose works extolling as national  
626 heroes the men of Turkish stock who had struggled against  
the establishment of the Russian imperium, must no longer  
be included in histories or anthologies, or be quoted with  
approval. Such actions are futile resistance by a lesser breed  
to an inevitable absorption in a larger whole by dialectical  
historical process working through the Russian people; that  
absorption, even if it pre-dated the Revolution, was, as it were,  
the shadow of what was to come. Those who presume to  
praise the 'heroes' of the resistance are guilty of ideological  
distortion, bourgeois-nationalism, patriarchal feudal survival-  
ism, and so on.

This condemnation extends to specific works. The  
*Kublandi-batir*, for instance, is no longer a paean of national  
virtue and valour, but low patter, extolling violence and  
brigandage. It is steeped in the poison of hatred for other  
peoples, in reactionary Muslim ideology and ideas of pan-  
Islam. A local savant is taken to task for presuming to assert  
that this poem is in content near to our own times, having as  
its basic idea patriotism and the love of the people. Only a  
bourgeois-nationalist could thus appraise a poem extolling  
cruelty and brigandage. All views of this kind must be

expunged from syllabuses and text-books. The various versions of the Uzbek *Alpamish* epic are as bad, and have not been saved by their translation into Russian. They are not people's epics but Khan's epics. When an Uzbek panegyrist praises them as symbols of all that is heroic and noble in the conceptions of the Uzbeks, he slanders the Uzbek working people by ascribing to them the desires and ideals of the Khans. As a folk-lore expert he should correct his views by reference to the teachings of the classics of Marxism/Leninism. Other objectionable poems are the so-called *Korkut Ata* or *Dede Korkut* epics. Certain Turkmen savants have been shameless enough to plagiarize what is in origin an epic of Azerbaijan. But that is not all. The epic itself is an idealization of the feudal system, conceals the class-struggle, and reveals a non-Marxist attitude to the heritage of the past. It is symbolic of the tendency of nationalism to retire within the confines of a national frontier, refusing to see that which binds the workers of all nationalities of the Soviet Union. The task is to strengthen the struggle against the smallest manifestations of bourgeois-nationalism, against glorification of an outdated culture, against every capitalist survival to be met with in the Asiatic parts of the Union. Yet Uzbeks, Kazaks and Turkmen persist in abstract praises of their 'motherlands'. One Turkmen even had the insolence to write a poem 'My Turkmenistan', and another a lyric entitled 'Thou Turkmen'. Both poems merely isolate the Turkmen artificially, representing only themselves as excelling in valour. It is their contribution to the great assemblage of Soviet peoples that must be stressed. No more bards with a religious-nationalistic ideology, praising Khans and priests, can be allowed.

In their place there has grown up an obsequious literature, best represented by the Kazak laureate Jambul (1846-1945). Like Saadi in one respect alone — he was almost a centenarian —, he has given his name, if only for a season, to the old town of Aulie Ata, near Chimkent. He is the author of poems extolling the Soviet high-priests and the banners of the Red

186 Army, which he sees as pointing the way into a world where  
 538 man can at last realize his destiny. Not for him the old,  
 626 unhappy, far-off things.

In Jambul's company this ideological war is then carried on to the ground of individual figures in history, and Kine Sari Khan the son of Kasim, the Kazak leader, comes in for special castigation. Historians are taken to task for publicizing in their works the reactionary-monarchist movement of 'K. Kasymov, the robber Khan'. Kine Sari was a reactionary and no defender of the people. Such defects can only be due to neglect of Bolshevik criticism in the literary circles of Kazakhstan. Historians and students alike must turn over a new leaf and cease to idealize brigands such as Kine Sari, Abilay and Nauruzbai. Artists and writers do not seem to realize the immense political changes which have taken place as a result of the carrying-out of the Lenin/Stalin national policy, and frequently take delight in an old and outworn past. They must not describe backward individuals as typical representatives of contemporary Soviet life. They must forswear literature of a formalist and cosmopolitan colour; that way lies pan-Turkism, pan-Iranism and pan-Islamism.

186 Music and the arts do not escape. In Kazakhstan musical  
 533 science is backward and on the wrong lines. The national  
 626 handbook of music is full of gross errors and idealizes a feudal past, regretting lost freedom. This is bourgeois-nationalism at its worst. Kazak musicians even dare to refer all musical achievement in the republic to the pre-revolutionary period, and to express such views publicly. In Uzbekistan the development of musical culture is far behind the economic, political and cultural growth of the republic — note the order — and does not meet the demands prescribed by the Party to the musical art, as a powerful means of Communist education of the workers. The minds of sculptors are low; they  
 186 do not deal with the heroic labour of the people in the pro-  
 532 duction of oil and cotton. One artist presumed to say his  
 626 pictures would be appreciated in ten years' time: an anticipation of the future is as bad as a delight in the past, for it

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is the duty of Soviet man to glory in the achievements of contemporary life.

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There is some unconscious humour. There is the outrageous instance of a worker who, though a member of an anti-God league, was found with his Comsomol ticket in one pocket and his religious charm in the other. Too few, we are told, are worried by the fact that there are not enough girls in Comsomols; a massed attack must be made on the girls in the collective farms and an ideological-creative spirit must be displayed by the youth. The Deputy Chairman has even been seen going to the cinema, while his wife, suppressed by his bourgeois-nationalist outlook, remains at home to mind the children. Stalin wants no more decadent verses with descriptions of heroes and their horses and cattle, no more delight in the beauties of nature, no more sob-stuff about roses, nightingales and lovely maidens — and certainly not erotic poetry —, no more pictures of aged greybeards who close their eyes to pray and waste time on the job. All these are foreign to the aesthetic tastes of the Soviet people. The heroic labour of miners, metal-workers, cotton-growers and engineers — these are the true themes for contemporary literature and the arts. And, chiefly, let all remember their big Russian brother, without thought to spare for a separate world and a tradition dead and gone.

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This picture is not overpainted; it can be seen in its full colours by any casual visitor to the Stalinist public gallery. It is not imaginary to suppose that this unrelenting effort is prompted by a certain unease. Here in Central Asia is an exposed flank, the source of raw materials vital to the survival of the Empire, the home of peoples whose memories of their own civilization make them probably the least assimilable of all elements in the Union. At any cost then, in this quarter above all, it is necessary to suppress every tendency towards a separate national consciousness. The question to be asked is this — how far has this unceasing stream of exhortation and

415 ways knotted like carpets (see ill. p. 1461).<sup>1</sup> Of these there are three principal kinds, the juval, a large camel-bag about five feet long and three feet wide, the somewhat smaller torba, and the karjin, which is carried on donkey-back. Whereas the juval and the torba, which are slung on either side of the camel, are always made in pairs, the karjin is a double pouch which is slung over the donkey's back, so that a bag hangs down on either side. These various receptacles, which take the place of cupboards or boxes, and which are used both on the march and in camp, may justly be described as textile furniture, no less so than the floor-carpet which serves the Islamic peoples both as a seat and as a bed. Turkoman carpets are distinguished from all others by their simple but vigorous beauty. All their patterns are geometrical, pictorial designs do not occur. The elements of the patterns are grouped in straight lines and at angles. Curves and circles are entirely foreign to the Turkoman style. Red, the favourite colour for women's dress, is also predominant in the carpets. All other colours are no more than accessories to red, the shade of which varies from deep purple to scarlet.


This uniformity is not only the result of a peculiar sense of style, but is also to be ex-

7 [Cat. 116, p. 72 -- Analyst]

The characteristic design preferred by the Sator Turkomans for their textile fabrics.



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*The jagged octagon, the figure found on all knotted work of the Tekke Turkomans.*

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plained by the strongly developed organization of the Turkoman peoples. It is based on a long tradition which is strictly observed. There are only a limited number of patterns for knotted work, each of which is the property and the distinctive badge of a certain tribe. The scope for variation is very limited, and deliberate artistic innovations do not occur. The probable reason for this is the fact that the Turkomans take a pride in proclaiming their membership of a certain tribe from afar, by the patterns of their camel-pouches when on the march, and by those of their tent-flaps when in camp. In principle this custom is not unlike that of the Scottish Highlanders to proclaim to which clan they belong by displaying its tartan in kilt and plaid.

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In Europe Turkoman carpets—and the fronts of the camel-bags, which are sold separately as rugs—usually go under the name of Bokhara, though not one of them was ever knotted there. In Bokhara a variation of a Persian design was used for ornamenting carpets. The name for Turkoman carpets current in the Indian carpet-trade indicates the region of Merv as their place of origin. That is correct

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•186  
177 Intermarriage is by far the most effective means of breaking down ethnic barriers. Prior to the Revolution, Russians and Muslims did not intermarry. If the interviews are correct, this continues to be the case today. A number of factors prevent intermarriage: the enormous cultural gap between Russians and Muslims, which ranges from such everyday matters as language, food, and type of residence to more subtle differences of national character and sexual customs; the considerable control which Muslim parents continue to exercise over their female children; and the great difficulty which a mixed family would have in finding a place in the Muslim or Russian community. The informants unanimously agreed that in Central Asia marriage between a Muslim girl and a Russian would be utterly unthinkable, since it would be prevented by the parents and the male relatives of the girl. Several of the refugee informants stated the opinion that a girl who would evade parental disapproval and marry a Russian would be assassinated by her male relatives; one recalled a specific instance of an Uzbek opera star who was killed by her brother for having married a Russian. Intermarriage is considered an insult to the family and to the nation. As one informant put it: "There are never enough girls for all the available Muslim suitors anyway; if a Muslim girl married a Russian that would mean that we weren't good enough for her."<sup>22</sup> None of the informants — who, it must be remembered, came from the ranks of the most Westernized Central Asian Muslims — knew personally any native girl who had married a Russian.

It appears much easier for a Muslim male to marry a Russian woman, and in some cases this happens because of the shortage of Muslim girls and the not inconsiderable number of Russian widows and prostitutes living in Central Asia. But such occurrences, too, seem rather rare. The informants who knew of such cases could recall only instances of Muslims living with Russian women without benefit of formal marriage; such Muslims are largely people whose homes have been broken up and who live with their wives or mistresses outside both Muslim and Russian communities.

The fact that the mere act of marrying an outsider leads to instant exclusion from the two dominant communities and forces the family to live in a social no-man's land is a strong deterrent to intermarriage. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of Russians and Muslims in Central Asia marry persons of their own ethnic group. Intermarriage appears very rare; insofar as it exists at all, it seems confined to the marginal groups of society, to persons who lack families and hence have little contact with their respective ethnic groups, or those who have left Central Asia and taken up residence in other parts of the Soviet Union.

162 <sup>22</sup> Indeed, the ratio of males to females in Central Asia was always high: in 1926 the proportion was 20 to 9 in favor of the males. Among the Russians, on the other hand, the ratio is reversed.

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.<sup>13</sup> Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

#### THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

<sup>13</sup> *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82-83.

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standards, the training of these "intellectuals," even graduates of universities, is quite poor. What matters, however, is not their level of knowledge, but their position vis-à-vis the rest of the population and the attitudes and aspirations resulting from their training. 517

Evidence indicates that the graduates of schools consider themselves superior to manual labor, and expect to be rewarded for their schooling with administrative or other office work. The Muslim intellectual seems to feel that education entitles one not so much to greater rewards as to a reduction of the working load. It is a professional intelligentsia which aspires to national leadership and is strongly interested in political action. 517 461 608

The Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia possesses many of the characteristics which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole, but in addition it also displays certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia. 517 177

The Muslim intelligentsia occupies in Central Asia a peculiar position: by origin, language, culture, and family ties, it is connected to the Muslim population; by training, work, and much of its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something of a third element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated regime and the native population. Such a class had existed, of course, in Central Asia prior to the Revolution, and it arises in most colonial systems, but it has never before been so numerous and ubiquitous as it is in Soviet Central Asia. What are its ideas, attitudes, and prospects? Upon the answer to this question depends to a large extent whether the potentialities of a Muslim revival in Central Asia can ever be realized.

Evidence secured from interviews indicates that Muslim intellectuals in Central Asia consider themselves full-fledged Europeans. Startling as this may be to a Westerner, it must be remembered that to many an Asian "Europe" means not so much a geographic concept as a way of life, characterized by technology and secularism, which had been brought to Asia by Europeans. None of the Central Asian refugees interviewed considered himself to be an Asian, and several took offence at the very suggestion that this may be the case. Most of the refugees have a vivid contempt for the non-Soviet East. For instance, several of the refugees who had served in the Soviet army in Iran during World War II spoke with utter contempt of the natives of that country as "Asiatics." Even Turkey, where several of the DP's found refuge after the war, appeared to them backward and "Oriental." Many Muslim DP's left Turkey for Germany or the United States after having been received there with open arms, because, as they put it, they found life there strange and difficult. 517 177 186

Despite its superficial Westernization and Sovietization, this new intelligentsia has not severed the ties binding it to the remainder of Muslim society in Central Asia. It is connected with the population culturally: the in-

517 intellectuals communicate with each other in the local Turki dialects, not in  
177 Russian; they retain the customs, traditions, and other cultural traits  
186 previously discussed; they marry Muslims. They also retain a sense of  
loyalty to their people, a loyalty which is sufficiently strong to be seemingly  
unaffected by the close ties between the intellectuals and the regime. It is  
noteworthy that the majority of the refugees, though outspokenly anti-  
Communist in their sentiments, agreed that there is little friction between  
Muslim Communists and the rest of the Muslim population. The popu-  
lation does not transfer its dislike of the regime to its individual Muslim  
representatives, nor does it seem to regard Muslim Communists as apos-  
tates. On the contrary, Muslim Party members are regarded rather as  
friends and protectors, capable of shielding the inhabitants from the full  
brunt of Soviet policies. Many refugees recalled instances of receiving spe-  
cial consideration from Muslim Communists. The population is inclined to  
regard Muslims connected with the Communist machine as unwitting  
instruments of an evil system and to judge them entirely on their individual  
merits. Conversely, interrogation of Muslim refugees who had at one time  
belonged to the Communist Party indicates that in their minds they have  
not changed their national status by virtue of their Party allegiance. The  
notion of an all-embracing "Soviet" patriotism, fostered by the regime  
in its borderlands, apparently has had little if any success among the  
intellectuals.

This combination of Westernism and ethnic loyalty leads to the develop-  
ment of a sense of national consciousness on the part of the intelligentsia.  
However, because of Soviet cultural measures in the borderlands, this  
feeling appears to be as yet rather formless, inchoate, and devoid of a  
well formulated ideology.

517 For one thing, the Muslim intelligentsia is woefully ignorant of the his-  
175 tory of Turkestan. This is hardly surprising, since the first histories of that  
177 area were published only after World War II (if one excepts the very  
scholarly and inaccessible monographs of Bartold and a few other schol-  
ars). The Soviet government deliberately minimizes the history of the  
Central Asian Turks and exaggerates the role of the Russian conqueror  
in order to undermine local nationalism and facilitate Russification. But  
the effect of these measures appears to be quite the opposite of what the  
Communists intend. Objectively speaking, the history of Turkestan is  
largely the story of the gradual conquest and destruction of a great Iranian  
civilization by barbarian Turkic nomads, resulting in perpetual internecine  
wars, isolation from the rest of the world, and cultural petrification of that  
area. In other words, the history of the Central Asian Turks is by no  
means a glorious one, either politically or culturally. By suppressing the  
study of native history, the regime actually helps stimulate the imagination  
of the native population. Ignorant of the facts, the natives glorify their  
past and create a mental picture of greatness which is quite unwarranted